George Berkeley: Part 2

As we examine Berkeley's middle period, we shall observe the passage from Locke to Plato. More accurately we shall observe the Berkeley's drift to Neoplatonism, and Hermetic philosophy. Berkeley like a lot of writers of his time seemed to confuse Neoplatonism and Hermeticism with Plato. First we must take care of some preliminaries, that shall become important as we proceed. The first issue is the distinction that Berkeley makes between ideas and notions. Ideas are products of sensation. What Locke would call simple ideas, such as: red, hard, pungent, etc. Ideas are purely passive they have no active power they are perceived by the agent. Notions are when as agent thinks about her ideas, and combines ideas into thoughts. What Locke would call complex or compound ideas. This is a good bridge to the second issue we must examine, the difference between ideas, and spirits. Only spirits have volition, or will. Only spirits are active. All motion is caused by spirits. Again ideas are completely passive, and have no power to generate themselves or other ideas, or notions. Berkeley's division between ideas and spirits can be instructive if we compare it to the dialectic of intellect and will. (see my essay "Cupid and Psyche) Berkeley never reaches the level of sophistication of later thinkers, of course Berkeley lived before Fiche, and Kant. Ideas would represent intellect, and spirits will. Remember ideas are passive, and spirits are active; so much so that all motions and force is caused by spirits. It must be said that Berkeley never has a completely consistent position on intellect and will, but he seems to come down on the side of intellect as the final term in the dialectic. God is seen as the supreme intellect, but he is also the supreme will. The two books we shall examine this essay are "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" hereafter referred to as "Dialogues" and "Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher" hereafter referred to as "Alciphron". "Alciphron" is also written in dialogue form, but more about this later. Many people regard the "Dialogues" as Berkeley's best book, an opinion I do not share. I would give that honor to "Alciphron". In the "Dialogues" Philonous represents Berkeley's position, while Hylas is usually the champion of the materialist position. Which should be obvious by the name "Hylas". Again like in the "Principles" Berkeley continues his defense of immateralism. That the qualities of simple ideas are somehow embedded in the ectoplasm of spirit, controlled by the guiding intelligence of God. To go back to one of my favorite analogies: that of video games. The program creates and coordinates the qualities we observe in objects, like the video game objects and qualities have independent existence. For the video game it is the program that controls the qualities, for Berkeley it is the mind of God. One of the few positions that Berkeley in his early writings that shall remain consistent to his last writings, is that God is continuously active. Unlike Leibniz where the preordained harmony would be a close analogy to the computer program, God being the programmer; in Berkeley there is no preordained harmony. Instead the constant laws of nature are a result of the continuous activity of God. This leads to Berkeley's two arguments for the existence of God: the continuity argument, and the passivity argument. The trouble with both arguments is for them to work one must already accept both Berkeley's immateralism, and his doctrine that ideas are passive. So let us move to the continuity argument. That there must be a mind to hold objects and ideas in existence when a finite mind is not perceiving them. Of course, one must accept that finite objects exist only when a mind perceives them, and there is no material substratum to hold ideas in existence when not being perceived. So let us now move to the passivity argument. That there must be a supreme mind to make sure that agents always experience a consistent law governed cosmos. Of course again, one must accept that ideas are completely passive, and cannot act on one another. In Berkeley's time this was not as much of a stretch as it is today. Causality was acknowledged by almost everyone as the mechanism governing change. That material substance or ideas comprising the external world were viewed as passive with no power to initiate change, or motion. Remember Berkeley was writing before Fichte changed the mechanism of change from causality to reciprocity. The most interesting part of the "Dialogues" is how it illustrates Berkeley's shift from empiricism to Platonism. Remember in the "Principles" ideas or sensations are real. We directly perceive reality. The objects really do have the properties we perceive. The trouble comes when two or more people perceive the same object or idea different ways. Let us first go to the classic example of Protagoras: two men stand in a wind, one says it is hot, the other says it is cold. Another example is two people are looking at the same tree at the same time, one a young girl the other a middle aged man with the typical male color blindness. The girl sees the tree as vivid green, the man sees the tree as greenish blue. So who is perceiving the idea rightly? In Berkeley's earlier view of the relativity of sensations gives no standard to judge by. Here is where Berkeley hammers the first nail into the coffin of his empiricism. His answer comes right out of Neoplatonism. That the idea or sensation in God's mind acts as an archetype, all finite minds only perceive an ectype. The archetype exists beyond finite minds, and cannot be perceived directly by finite minds; only the ectype is perceived by finite minds. So much for our direct perception of the properties of the external world, and the relativity of qualities; that all perceptions are equally valid. Berkeley has introduced a doctrine that shall dominate his later thinking. The great chain of being; that some things are more real than other things. So let us move to "Alciphron" which I consider Berkeley's best book. The book was written to combat English Deism, and freethinkers, it was also the most widely read of Berkeley's books in his lifetime. Although now largely forgotten. To start with let us examine the title: "Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher". Alciphron is one of the characters in the seven dialogues that compose the book. The Minute Philosopher is a reference form Cicero about those philosophers that diminish the place of humans place in the cosmos. Minute means diminished not the time measurement. Those that deny the immortality of the soul, reducing human existence to a mere pittance. Alexander Cambell Fraiser (Berkeley's best editor) calls Berkeley's position in "Alciphron" theological utilitarianism, which is a good description. "Alciphron" also contains much material that will seem dated by the modern reader, but is interesting if one examines it from the point of view that Berkeley was writing in an earlier phase of the moral crisis the West is still experiencing. There is also much that is of interest to a contemporary reader. "Alciphron" also shows Berkeley's drift from empiricism to Neoplatonism and Hermetic philosophy. The first Dialogue attempts to lay out the principles of free thinkers and Deists (minute philosophers). It starts with what is natural to humans, and that religion is form of social control. The Minute Philosophers argue to find what is natural to humans, we must find actions that can be universalized across all human cultures, that this is the only way to discover human nature in an uncorrected state. Of course in Berkeley's view this only leads to discovering what is base in human nature. For Berkeley reason and culture are both legitimate aspects of human nature. That different cultures can be compared to different climates and soils where plants grow. That just as certain climates, and soils make for lush, and healthy plants, so some cultures provide humans with a better environment to realize their potential. The other issue is that of religion being a method of social control. The Minute Philosophers think that only nature can provide a standard for our actions. Here we get our first glimpse of Berkeley's theological utilitarianism. That indeed religion does act as a form of social control, but that is not a problem. For in a state of nature no sophisticated culture could develop, That without social constraints culture and civilization would be impossible. And that if people believe there is a higher power overseeing their actions, they tend to act more honestly. The second Dialogue is to refute the position of Manedvllle in "Fable of the Bees". This is one of the more interesting Dialogues for a modern audience, because much of Mandeville's position is now accepted in the present day. The position being that private vice leads to public good. We still hear the same arguments today that vices such as tobacco and liquor increase prosperity. That the tobacco and liquor industries employ lots of people so help spread wealth around. That the vices of the vain rich are good for the other classes in society, since they create industries that employ people and promote commerce. Another example used the Dialogue (which is still used today) , is that the high end fashion industry employs lots of people, thus spreading the wealth around. Berkeley's arguments against are again familiar. That in the long run businesses like liquor and tobacco pose a higher cost to society. An example from today is of course tobacco, that it does employ lots of people, but the cost in healthcare is way more damaging to society that any prosperity it creates. One of the interesting points of this Dialogue is the case against vanity. Today it is hard to find anyone who regards vanity as a vice to be condemned. Like I said society today has accepted much of Mandeville's position. Berkeley claims vanity makes people shallow, and vain in their youth, and covetous, and acquisitive in old age. In other words vanity leads to the crudest materialism. (the whole book was of course written to combat materialism, both ethical and metaphysical) Thus it would be better for rich fashionable women to contribute the money to charity than buy extravagant clothes. I shall leave it to the reader to render her own judgement on Berkeley's position. In the third Dialogue it is Shaftsbury's ethics which are examined. That morality is a taste, and virtue is its own reward. In combating the position that morality is a taste, we can clearly observe Berkeley coming down on the side of intellect over will. That morality must be based on clear principles, not an emotion. That ethics is an aim, and function, not just a feeling. That people will not follow laws, because they are good or beautiful. That religion and a judgement in the afterlife, only promote good behavior, and provide the proper impetus for people to follow laws. The fourth Dialogue get back to familiar territory. Berkeley gives another proof of God's existence, but it suffers from the same flaws of his other arguments for God's existence. To prove that God exists, Berkeley claims that God speaks to us in a visual language. This recalls much of his book: "Towards a New Theory of Vision". Let us go to a quote from the fourth Dialogue: "But if it shall appear plainly that God speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, outward, sensible signs, having no resemblance or necessary connection with the things they stand for and suggest if it shall appear that, by innumerable combinations of these signs, an endless variety of things is discovered and made know to us:" What Berkeley is saying here is that God speaks to us in a visual language. Remember, his theory of vision, that the things we perceive by sight have no connection with the tangible qualities perceived by touch. That we must learn to use visual sensation like language. That visual signs stand for tangible qualities, not because they correlate naturally, but because we learn how to use visual perception, like we use language. Back to Berkeley: "The littleness or faintness of appearance, or any other idea or sensation not necessarily connected with or resembling distance, can no more suggest different degrees of distance,or any distance at all to the mind which hath not experienced a connection to the things signifying and signified, then words suggest notions, before a man hath learned the language" Although this is of doubtful value in proving the existence of God, it does again show Berkeley is backing off his claim that all perceptions whether visual, audio, tangible, etc. are of equal value. Instead, it is clear that tangible qualities act as a standard. Let us now move to Berkeley's criticism of abstract ideas, and again we shall observe ambiguity with his early writings. We shall use the idea of motion as an example. Berkeley seems to have has an interest in the subject, since he wrote a tract on the subject: "De Motu". Berkeley's theory that all our ideas of motion or force are derived, from effects. That there is no idea of motion that is not derived from observing how objects act. That the idea of motion is an abstract idea from observed effects; we only have the notion of motion buy abstracting out the objects that are affected. Berkeley does admit that the notion of motion is useful. So now Berkeley turns to the idea of "grace". So let us go to the seventh Dialogue to observe how he connects "grace', and "force or motion". "Ought we not therefore, by a parity of reason, to conclude there may be divers true and useful propositions concerning the one as well as the other? And that grace may be an object of our faith, and influence our life and actions, as a principle destructive of evil habits and productive of good ones, although we cannot attain a distinct idea of it separate or abstracted from God the author, from the man the subject, and from virtue and piety of its effects" It is clear that Berkeley still holds a correspondence theory of truth. Berkeley never made the leap that Bradley would make, that all our knowledge is experience alone. That we cut experience up to attain our ends,there are no independently existing ideas or material things, all our ideas and notions are only products of experience, and how we decide to cut up experience. It seems the analytic school could have saved a lot of time trying to solve Wittgenstein's riddles if they had just read Berkeley. We have only one more issue to examine in this essay. Berkeley is drifting towards an answer to all these ambiguities in his thinking; a very traditional answer. That of Neoplatonism and Hermetic philosophy, that there is a hierarchy of being; the Great Chain of Being. we can also clearly observe that Hermetic philosophy is becoming important to Berkeley. So there shall be no doubt about his drift to alchemical and Hermetic thought we go to the sixth Dialogue: "The volatile salt is properly the essence of the soul of the plant, containing all its virtue; and the oil is the vehicle of this subtle part of the soul, that which fixes and individuates it." Berkeley's empiricism is sick with its final illness