Dissolving Wittgenstein

Dissolving Wittgenstein by Eric Hoffmann

The purpose of this essay is to examine, evaluate and argue against Wittgenstein's claim that metaphysical problems should be dissolved instead of solved. For the purpose of economy only one metaphysical problem shall be examined: the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is one of the central questions of metaphysics, so it should be a good test of Wittgenstein's method.

Let us begin with a very brief sketch of the mind-body problem in western philosophy. Like so much in western philosophy we must start with Rene Descartes. Descartes posited that mind and body are two different substances. So the question comes up of how do they interact? Needless to say Descartes did not give a satisfactory answer or we would not have the mind-body problem. On the European continent Benedict Spinoza and Gottfried von Leibniz tried to solve the problem. In Great Britain, John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume all tried to give an answer of the mind-body problem. Of the above thinkers, Locke and Leibniz seemed to make the problem worse. Hume fell into skepticism, and Spinoza and Berkeley seemed to offer some hope that a solution could be had.

So let us take a brief look at Spinoza and Berkeley. Spinoza attempted to collapse mind and body, or thought and extension into one substance. One substance with two attributes-thought and extension. Spinoza came up with the right answer, but could not show how he came up with the answer. In the words of a high school math teacher, Spinoza needed to “show his work”. The right answer is no good without the process of getting to the answer. Telling us the primary substance or one substance is God does not help. Instead of solving the problem of the underlying substance, he leaves us with an even more mysterious entity than we started with. Berkeley also proposes monism, and does show us his work. Berkeley solves the mind-body problem by getting rid of body. The trouble with Berkeley is that he must also bring in God as part of the solution.

We shall skip Immanuel Kant with only one comment. Kant brings mere tools and sophistication to the problem than anyone before. After Kant, we again have more work on the mind-body problem in the persons of J. Fichte, F.W. von Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. Fichte's solution is very much like Berkeley. So we shall turn to Schelling and Hegel. Schelling probably does more and better work on the mind-body problem than anyone before him. Schelling may or may not have been the first person to coin the term “Absolute”, but he does more with the term than anyone else. Schelling's Absolute is the underlying identity of mind and body. The third term that lies underneath both ind and body. This is why Schelling's early philosophy was called Identity philosophy, not as most people think to confuse students of philosophy. It is important to keep in mind that the Absolute is below the level of reason. This is why Schelling called for a mythology of reason in his book “A System of Transcendental Idealism.”

Hegel was much influenced by Schelling, but made a crucial distinction that differs from Schelling. This difference affects all of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel decided that the Absolute was in or above reason. Hegel's Absolute is an overlying reality instead of an underlying identity. This has led to much confusion. In many respects Hegel's philosophy looks like a bottom-up system but it is really a top-down system. All differences in the cosmos are reconciled above reason. The cosmos is a working out of reason and or logic. This is why it is said that Hegel collapsed metaphysics into logic. Now we must leave philosophy and theory for science and history.

Charles Darwin's theory of evolution destroyed the top-down way of viewing nature. Around the same time as Darwin, Great Britain and Germany became rivals for world power. This led to a distaste for “German philosophy” in the English speaking world. These tensions also led to World War I. World War I destroyed the optimism of the nineteenth century. All these factors led to a return to empiricism in the English speaking countries.

The new Empiricism was led by G,E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. The new Anglo-American philosophy rejected the advances mad by German philosophy and British Idealism, and went back to the ideas of Hume. They also replicated the success or lack of success of Hume. They soon discovered that the mind-body problem cannot be solved by the methods and tools of empirical philosophy. The stage is now set for Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein asserted if problems cannot be solved; they can be dissolved. Wittgenstein refused to debate whether mental processes exist; instead he examined the circumstances in which people talk as if mental states or processes exist. We can do no better than quote form Wittgenstein's “Philosophical Investigations”: “How does the philosophical problem about mental processes, states and behaviorism arise?” The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)

The above quotation makes Wittgenstein very hard to argue with, because he is refusing to argue. At first reading the above quotation seems very strange. So to help us understand Wittgenstein's position, let us use an analogy drawn from everyday life. We have all met dysfunctional people and families that refuse to try and solve their problems; instead they become experts at talking around their problems. They have given up trying to solve their problem. Instead they have analyzed every situation where the problem arises, and have developed strategies in order to avoid the problem. In Wittgenstein's language they have dissolved their problems, but have not solved their problems. These people like Wittgenstein have become experts at talking around their problems.

The only way to argue against this way of thinking is to confront the mind-body problem head-on, and look to past thinkers to see if we can get some help or clues to a solution. I believe the most fruitful approach was that of Schelling. That we should try to find an underlying identity of mind and body. This also agrees with the insights of Darwin. We should look for a common ancestor for mind and body. Is there a common ancestor or underlying third term for mind and body; Schelling, Bradley and J.P. Sartre have all tried and failed, or have they been misled? They have been misled because they tried to simply reverse the usual top-down metaphysics. So instead of arriving at a Plotinian One they have arrived at a Parmenidian One. The trouble was the answer was hiding in plain sight: activity. Body or extended matter is constant and unceasing activity. Mind or internal states is the imagined activity of extended matter. Imagined activity is the ability of the brain to replicate the experience of external activity in an attenuated form, so the agent can feel the activity without preforming the activity. All Wittgenstein really demonstrated is that when a problem is not confronted, the problem only gets worse.